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Abstract
This article presents a classiVcation of metonymy-based euphemism-formation
mechanisms from a cognitive linguistic point of view. It is argued that all met-
onymic euphemisms can be analyzed as products of three major euphemism-
formation strategies: 1) violation of the principle important over less impor-
tant; 2) violation of the principle specific over generic; and 3) violation of the
principle more true over less true.
1 Introduction
It is a well-known fact that taboo-marked concepts are often expressed by met-
onymic euphemisms, i. e., expressions like to sleep with somebody and boyfriend,
whose euphemistic senses “to copulate with somebody” / “a regular male sexual
partner of almost any age over puberty in a non-marital sexual relationship”
are contiguously related to their literal senses “to be in the state of sleep” / “a
friend who is a boy.” Thus, a person with whom a woman has a regular non-
marital sexual relationship is often perceived as her friend in the literal meaning
of this word, i. e., as any person whom she “know[s] well and regard[s] with
aUection and trust” (WordNet). Additionally, copulation is often followed by
physical sleeping, i. e., lovers have sex and then fall asleep together in the same
bed.
However, despite the recognition of the role of metonymy as an important
euphemism-formation mechanism (e. g., Blank, 1999), there have been almost no
studies on the typology of metonymic euphemisms, i. e., studies dealing with the
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question of whether metonymy-based euphemisms prefer a particular semantic
pattern (e. g., part-for-whole metonymy) and, if so, why this is the case. Drawing
upon the seminal work on metonymy by Kövecses & Radden (1998), this article
attempts to Vll in the research gap by classifying metonymic euphemisms into the
following three categories: 1) metonymic euphemisms whose vehicle concepts vi-
olate the principle important over less important; 2) metonymic euphemisms
whose vehicle concepts violate the principle specific over generic; and 3) meto-
nymic euphemisms whose vehicle concepts violate the principle more true over
less true.
The article utilizes the following structure. The next section discusses the de-
Vning characteristics of euphemistic expressions. That is, for example, how do we
know that the aforementioned to sleep with somebody and boyfriend are indeed eu-
phemisms? The following section provides a general classiVcation of euphemism-
formation mechanisms into semantic and non-semantic types: Among other
things, it will be argued that all semantically motivated euphemisms can be an-
alyzed as products of either metonymic or metaphoric semantic change. The Vnal
sections present a critical discussion of the distinction between default and non-
default metonymies proposed by Kövecses & Radden (1998) and elaborate on the
classiVcation of metonymic euphemisms into the three categories named above.
2 Euphemism and related phenomena
A euphemism can be deVned as an indirect means of expressing a taboo-marked
(i. e., a distasteful, unpleasant) concept.1 For example, the euphemistic phrase
to sleep with somebody expresses the taboo-marked meaning “to copulate with
somebody” without explicitly referring to the taboo subject sex: To sleep with
somebody literally means “to spend time together while being in the state of sleep,”
not “to have sex.” Similarly, the compound boyfriend expresses the taboo-marked
meaning “a regular male sexual partner in a non-marital sexual relationship”
1 In this respect, a euphemism may not diUer from a dysphemism. For example, just like the eu-
phemism to sleep with somebody, the dysphemism to bang somebody can also be seen as an indirect
means of expressing the taboo-marked meaning “to have sex with somebody”: To bang does not
literally mean “to copulate” but “to strike sharply” (Merriam-Webster Online). The diUerence be-
tween the two expressions is that the euphemism to sleep with somebody is a much more polite
means of expressing the meaning “to have sex” than the dysphemism to bang somebody: According
to Merriam-Webster Online, the latter is a vulgar expression.
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without explicitly referring to the fact that a boyfriend is a sexual partner: If we
consider only the literal meanings of the components boy and friend, we arrive
at the taboo-free meaning “a friend who is a boy,” not “a sexual partner.”
According to Holder (2008:vii), “In speech or writing we use euphemism for
dealing with taboo or sensitive subjects. It is therefore the language of eva-
sion, hypocrisy, prudery, and deceit.” A more recent study (Moskvin, 2010:75–99),
however, insists on the separation of euphemism from related phenomena, such
as, for example, lie. To illustrate this point, let us consider the following utter-
ance: Daddy’s in Heaven to explain that “Daddy is dead.” Like sexuality, death
is (in many cultures) a taboo-marked topic, which has given rise to numerous
euphemistic expressions. Already in 1936, Louise Pound published an article enti-
tled “American Euphemisms for Dying, Death, and Burial: An Anthology” (1936),
in which she mentioned such death-related phrases and utterances as he has left
us, gone from us, sunk into his last sleep, called to the eternal sleep, laid to rest, rests
in peace till we meet again, gone to his Heavenly Father, gone to meet his Savior,
answered the Vnal call, played his last card, etc.
What is particularly interesting about these expressions is that most of them
can be used as both euphemisms and non-euphemisms. With regard to the latter,
consider the following situation: The speaker of Daddy’s in Heaven is a religious
person who Vrmly believes in the afterlife. Evidently, the utterance Daddy’s in
Heaven is, for that speaker, in no respect diUerent from an utterance like Daddy’s
in Berlin now (uttered when the speaker knows that Daddy is indeed in Berlin
now) and, accordingly, cannot be regarded as a euphemism (Moskvin, 2010:105).
Consider the opposite situation: The speaker of Daddy’s in Heaven does not be-
lieve in life after death. S/he knows that, in reality, Daddy is not in heaven, but is
dead and buried in the ground. However, in order not to shock the dead Daddy’s
small child who wants to know where his/her father now is, the speaker does not
tell the truth, Daddy’s dead, but instead says Daddy’s in Heaven. In this case, the
utterance in question is also not a euphemism but a lie, just like the utterance
Daddy’s in Berlin now uttered when the speaker knows that Daddy is now not in
Berlin but instead in, e. g., Kabul.
According to Moskvin (2010:93–94), euphemism is diUerent from lie in that
in the former case, the speaker does not intend to deceive or mislead the hearer.
That is, for example, when a speaker of English utters a euphemistic utterance like
John sleeps with Sarah and John is Sarah’s boyfriend, s/he does not want to disguise
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the facts that John and Sarah do not merely sleep together in the same bed and
that John is more than just a friend who is a boy. Instead, the speaker wants to
communicate the taboo-marked meanings “John copulates with Sarah” and “John
is Sarah’s regular sexual partner to whom she is not oXcially married” without
explicitly referring to the taboo subject sex. Hence, a death-related utterance like
Daddy’s in Heaven can be regarded as a euphemism only in one case: When the
speaker wants to indirectly communicate the taboo-marked meaning “Daddy is
dead,” but not when the speaker wants to conceal the fact of Daddy’s death from
the hearer. While the former is a euphemism, the latter is a lie. (We will return
to this distinction in the Vnal section of this article.)
3 Euphemism-formation mechanisms: a general
classiVcation
Having speciVed the deVnition of euphemism, we can now proceed to euphemism-
formation mechanisms, i. e., the question of how euphemistic expressions like to
sleep with somebody, boyfriend, to be in Heaven, gone from us, etc. come into
existence. This issue has been extensively dealt with in a number of studies.
For example, Moskvin (2010:163–227, 2001:64–67) discusses how euphemisms are
formed in present-day Russian. Reutner (2009:119–154) addresses the same ques-
tion with respect to French and Italian. Farghal (1995) deals with euphemism-
formation mechanisms in Arabic. Adams (1981) is concerned with the formation
of sexual euphemisms in Latin. As far as the English language is concerned, this
question has been dwelled upon by Warren (1992) and, more recently, by Linfoot-
Ham (2005), Crespo Fernández (2008, 2007, 2006a, 2006b), and Halmari (2011).
(The latter article is concerned with one particular instance of euphemization:
a recent replacement of premodiVed nouns like disabled people by postmodiVed
nouns like people with disabilities.)
Traditionally, euphemism-formation mechanisms have been classiVed into se-
mantic and non-semantic types (e. g., Warren, 1992:134). An instance of the lat-
ter is the famous inVxed form with an expletive meaning absoschmuckinglutely
(which, according to Adams (1999), can be better described as a euphemistic dys-
phemism). The euphemistic eUect is achieved here by means of a consonant
change in the original expletive inVx –fucking–: [f] is replaced by the cluster
[ʆm], as a result of which absoschmuckinglutely can express the same expletive
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meaning as absofuckinglutely, without, however, evoking the negative connota-
tions inherent in -fucking-. Also, instead of changing [f] to [ʆm], fuck can be
abbreviated to f – e. g., I’m sorry I said the f-word (Davies, 2008-).
Apart from consonant interchange, abbreviation, and other phonetic modiV-
cations, non-semantic strategies are sometimes said to include borrowing (e. g.,
Moskvin, 2001:67). However, as will be shown below, a loanword often functions
as a euphemism not only because it is a loanword, but also because its source
language literal meaning is not identical with the taboo-marked meaning that it
expresses in the language of a borrowing community. For instance, a doctoral
thesis defended at a German university can be graded with the Latin expression
cum laude, which literally means “with praise” (Brockhaus, 2005-2006). How-
ever, despite its literal meaning in Latin, cum laude is a rather poor dissertation
grade in Germany. Thus, a person whose doctoral degree was awarded cum laude
is not eligible for most post-doctoral stipends or fellowships, and his thesis will
most likely not be accepted for publication by a serious academic press (see, e. g.,
“Forschungsstipendien für promovierte Nachwuchswissenschaftler (Postdoc-Pro-
gramm),” n. d.). Accordingly, the euphemistic use of cum laude is possible not
only because of the non-German origin of the phrase under consideration (i. e.,
the fact that the majority of German speakers do not know what cum laudemeans
in Latin), but also because of its literal meaning in Latin (“with praise”), which is
a converse of what it actually stands for in German (“poor dissertation”). (The
latter fact allows the grader to maximize praise2 of his doctoral student who pre-
sented a poorly written dissertation.) A somewhat similar example is the French
borrowing à outrance (literally “to the utmost”), which, in English, is sometimes
used as a euphemism for extramarital copulation – e. g., I think if anyone read
carefully they would say it was an aUair à outrance (Holder, 2008:75). Again, as
in the case of cum laude in German, it can be argued that à outrance functions
as a euphemism in English not only because it was borrowed from French but
also because its French literal meaning of “to the utmost” is not identical with the
euphemistic sense “extramarital copulation.” (As a matter of fact, à outrance can
be used in English not only as a euphemism for “extramarital copulation” but also
as a non-euphemistic adverb meaning “to the limit” (Merriam-Webster Online),
i. e., what à outrance means in French.)
2 In the sense of the maxim of praise of the Leechian politeness principle (see, e. g., Cruse, 2004:37).
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As for purely semantic means, euphemistic expressions can be classiVed into
instances of metonymic and metaphoric semantic change. Following LakoU and
Turner (1989:103), the diUerence between metonymy and metaphor can be de-
scribed as within-domain mapping (metonymy) versus cross-domain mapping
(metaphor). A conceptual domain is “a more generalized ‘background’ knowledge
conVguration against which conceptualization is achieved” (Taylor, 2002:195). For
example, in order to understand the meaning of cum laude in German, we need
the concept of dissertation grades in German universities, of which the concept
of cum laude is a part. Accordingly, we can claim that the former is the domain
against which the latter is conceptualized in German.
Like other metonymic expressions, metonymic euphemisms can be classiVed
into whole-for-part, part-for-whole, and part-for-part metonymies. A part-for-
part metonymy is a metonymy like cum laude, whose vehicle concept (i. e., its
literal meaning) stands for another element within the same conceptual domain.
Thus, both the literal meaning “with praise” and the euphemistic sense “poor
quality” can be regarded as evaluative characteristics of a doctoral dissertation:
i. e., a grader can come to the conclusion that a Ph.D. thesis either deserves praise
or is of poor quality. However, when the latter is the case, the thesis is graded
cum laude, even though the grader knows that the thesis is of poor quality and
thus does not deserve to be praised. (When the grader comes to the conclusion
that the thesis is of good quality and hence deserves praise, s/he grades it with
either magna cum laude or summa cum laude, but never with cum laude.) Ac-
cordingly, the euphemistic use of cum laude as a dissertation grade in Germany
is an instance of part-for-part metonymy: one element of the domain evalua-
tive characteristics of a doctoral thesis (“with praise”) stands for another
element of the same domain (“poor quality”).
A part-for-whole metonymy is a metonymy like boyfriend, whose vehicle con-
cept stands for an entire conceptual domain of which it is a part: As stated in
the beginning of the article, boyfriends are often perceived by their girlfriends
as friends in the literal meaning of this word (i. e., as any persons whom they
know well and regard with aUection and trust). Accordingly, the literal concept
of friendship can be said to constitute part of the concept of boyfriend-ship, i. e.,
a boyfriend is not only a sexual partner in a non-marital sexual relationship but
also a friend.
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Finally, a whole-for-part metonymy is a metonymy like adult for “erotic /
pornographic” – e. g., in the phrase an adult Web site – whose euphemistic sense
“erotic / pornographic” is an instance (or a part) of the vehicle concept “adult.” The
adjective adult literally means “fully developed and mature” (Merriam-Webster
Online). Accordingly, the phrase an adult Web site could have meant “any Web
site suitable for fully developed and mature people.” However, an adult Web site is
a particular instance of a Web site appropriate for adults: a Web site that contains
pornographic material.
Metaphoric euphemisms fall into those that realize conceptual metaphors and
those that are based on one-shot or image metaphors. Conceptual metaphors
are characterized by systematic correspondences between their source and target
domains (e. g., LakoU & Johnson, 1980:52–55). This means that more than one
expression pertaining to one and the same source domain can be used in con-
nection with one and the same target domain. For example, the collocation to
come to an orgasm (as well as its elliptic version to come) realizes the conceptual
metaphor purposes are destinations (cf. Crespo Fernández, 2008:101): Apart
from an orgasm, we also come to a conclusion, a solution, a decision, a verdict,
a result, etc. Also, in addition to coming, an orgasm can be reached (e. g., “Are
you having trouble reaching orgasm? A guide for women,” 2011, May 22) and
arrived at (e. g., A very distinctive feature with the female orgasm is that women
Vnd it quite hard to arrive at an orgasm from intercourse alone, “How to Make
Your Woman Reach an Orgasm Fast!”, 2012, February 29). By contrast, one-shot
metaphors involve less systematic correspondences between their source and tar-
get domains and are, therefore, perceived as more metaphoric and Vgurative than
conceptual metaphors (Tokar, 2009:8–10). For example, to ride meaning “to cop-
ulate with a man in the woman-on-top position” seems to have a much higher
degree of metaphoricity than to come meaning “to achieve an orgasm.” This is
because apart from the visual similarity between a person sitting on a horse / bi-
cycle while riding it and a woman sitting on her sexual partner while copulating
with him, no other element of the source domain riding a horse / bicycle takes
part in the mapping onto the target domain copulating in the woman-on-top
position. Thus, a male sexual partner whom a woman rides is neither a horse nor
a bicycle. We are justiVed in claiming this because neither to ride a horse nor to
ride a bicycle occurs in the sense “to copulate with a man while being on top.”
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Since metonymic mappings involve no more than one conceptual domain while
metaphoric mappings are cross-domain mappings, metonymic euphemisms can
usually be relatively easily distinguished from metaphoric euphemisms: In the
former case, we feel that there is a more or less real link between what the ex-
pression under analysis literally means and what it denotes as a euphemism. For
example, there is a real link between the meanings “with praise” and “poor qual-
ity”: Both are evaluative characteristics that can be given to a doctoral thesis.
Similarly, there is a real link between the meanings “a friend” and “a sexual part-
ner”: Sexual partners are often perceived as friends. Finally, there is a real link
between the meanings “adult” and “pornographic”: Pornography is believed to
be harmful to children and is, therefore, appropriate for adults only. By contrast,
in the case of a metaphoric euphemism, no such link can be established. Thus,
there is no real link between the meanings “to come” and “to achieve an orgasm”:
Because copulation typically does not involve motion (i. e., lovers do not move
from one place to another while having sex), reaching an orgasm cannot be an
instance of coming. Similarly, there is no real link between the meanings “to ride”
and “to copulate with a man while being on top of him”: Since a male lover whom
a woman copulates with while being on top is neither a horse nor a bicycle, sexual
riding cannot be an instance of physical riding.
In addition to metonymic and metaphoric euphemisms, Warren (1992:131–
132) classiVes semantically motivated euphemisms into instances of the following
mechanisms:
• particularization; e. g., satisfaction for “orgasm.” This euphemistic meaning
of “orgasm” represents a subcategory of the literal meaning “satisfaction”:
an orgasm is a kind of satisfaction.
• implication; e. g., to go to the toilet for “to urinate and / or defecate.” There
is an antecedent–consequent relationship between the literal meaning of “to
go to the toilet” and the euphemistic meaning of “to urinate / defecate”: First
of all, we physically move to the place toilet, and only then do we urinate
and / or defecate in it.
• reversal or irony; e. g., enviable disease for “syphilis.” The euphemistic use
of this expression creates an ironic eUect, since syphilis is, of course, not an
enviable disease.
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• understatement or litotes; e. g., drug habit for “drug addiction.” The undesir-
able feature drug addiction is downgraded to drug habit, which can be
any habit concerning drugs.
• overstatement or hyperbole; e. g., sanitary engineer for “garbage collector.”
The non-prestigious occupation of a garbage collector is upgraded to that of
an engineer.
This article argues against this classiVcation. The major problemwithWarren’s
approach is the fact that it distinguishes between particularization, implication,
and metonymy-based euphemisms. Let us begin with the category of particu-
larization. As stated above, particularization euphemisms are expressions like
satisfaction for “orgasm,” whose euphemistic senses represent a subcategory of
what they literally mean. To be more precise, there exists a hyponym–hypernym
relationship between the former and the latter. For example, the meaning “or-
gasm” is a hyponym of the meaning “satisfaction,” since, as already mentioned,
an orgasm is a kind of satisfaction. Similarly, the euphemistic meaning of the pill,
as in, for example, she is on the pill, which stands for “she uses contraceptive pills,”
is a hyponym of the literal meaning of “pill”: A contraceptive pill is a kind of pill.
In summary, in particularization euphemisms, such as satisfaction and the pill,
the euphemistic eUect results from the replacement of a taboo-marked hyponym
(orgasm, contraceptive pill) by a taboo-free hypernym (satisfaction, the pill), the
latter having a very broad meaning that subsumes a number of taboo-free hy-
ponyms – e. g., apart from contraceptive pills, there are headache pills, sleeping
pills, vitamin pills, etc.
Following Moskvin (2001:65, 2010:194–195), this euphemism-formation mecha-
nism can perhaps be better referred to as hypernymization, rather than as partic-
ularization; regardless of our terminological choice, however, it must be stressed
that all euphemisms of this type are metonymies. Indeed, as correctly analyzed by
Kövecses (2006:104), just like the previously mentioned example adult for “porno-
graphic,” the euphemistic use of the pill represents a whole-for-part metonymy
in which the conceptual domain pill evokes one of its members: the category of
contraceptive pills. In the same way, in the case of satisfaction for “orgasm,” the
conceptual domain satisfaction stands for one of its parts: sexual satisfaction
/ orgasm.
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Now, let us proceed to the category of implication. That the distinction be-
tween metonymy-based and implication euphemisms is untenable can be illus-
trated with the example bathroom for “toilet.” According to Warren, bathroom
can be analyzed as a metonymic euphemism because of the locative relationship
between the senses “a room with a bath” and “toilet”: Toilets often contain a
bathtub. (Or alternatively, a bathroom is a room that, apart from a bathtub, also
often contains a lavatory pan.) At the same time, however, it can be argued that
the euphemistic use of bathroom is motivated by the antecedent–consequent rela-
tionship between the events of using a lavatory pan and using a bath. That
is, before taking a bath, people usually urinate / defecate in a lavatory pan. (The
fact that one and the same room often contains both a bathtub and a lavatory pan
corroborates the antecedent–consequent motivation of bathroom.)
A very similar example is the utterance Where can I wash my hands? which,
as Kövecses & Radden (1998:72) point out, can stand for “Where is the nearest
toilet?” On the one hand, the underlying motivation seems to be of a locative
character: Toilets contain washbasins so that toilet visitors can wash their hands.
At the same time, however, the euphemistic use of this utterance can be said
to be motivated by the antecedent–consequent relationship between the events
urination / defecation andwashing hands. In the prototypical case, the latter
immediately follows the former: People urinate / defecate in a lavatory pan and
then wash their hands in a washbasin. (This explains why toilets are places that
contain washbasins.)
The fact that one and the same euphemism can be plausibly analyzed as an
instance of both implication and metonymy clearly indicates that the distinc-
tion between these two categories cannot be sustained. Like particularization
euphemisms, euphemisms involving an antecedent–consequent relationship be-
tween their literal and euphemistic senses are also metonymies. The only diUer-
ence is that implication euphemisms – such as to go to the toilet and Where can
I wash my hands? – are not whole-for-part, but rather, they are part-for-whole
metonymies. That is, for example, the act of (literally) going to some toilet is part
of the prototypical scenario of using toilets: In order to urinate / defecate, we,
Vrst of all, literally go to the place toilet. The same can be said about washing
hands. This concept is also part of the prototypical scenario of using toilets: After
urination / defecation, we typically wash our hands.
246
Metonymic Euphemisms from a Cognitive Linguistic Point of View
With regard to the categories of litotes / understatement and hyperbole / over-
statement, the following must be noted. As analyzed by Warren (1992), using
drug habit for “drug addiction” is an instance of litotes because the negative
feature drug addiction is downgraded to drug habit (which can be any fea-
ture regarding drugs), whereas the use of sanitary engineer acts as an instance
of hyperbole because the non-prestigious occupation garbage collector is up-
graded to engineer. The problem with this analysis is that it confuses semantic
euphemism-formation mechanisms (metonymy and metaphor) with pragmatic
eUects achieved by them (under- and overstatement). What is meant by this is
that, similar to satisfaction and the pill, drug habit can also be analyzed as a whole-
for-part metonymy in which the conceptual domain drug habit stands for one
of its members: the category of drug addiction. This semantic strategy underlies
the euphemistic use of drug habit and results in the pragmatic downgrading of
the negative feature drug addiction. (This eUect arises because drug addiction
is perceived as a bad habit. In contrast, in the case of satisfaction and the pill, there
is no pragmatic downgrading because neither an orgasm nor a contraceptive pill
is perceived as a bad subcategory of the domains satisfaction and pill: An or-
gasm is not a bad satisfaction, and a contraceptive pill is not a bad pill.) Similarly,
in sanitary engineer the underlying semantic strategy is not overstatement but a
part-for-part metonymy in which one member of the domain profession (engi-
neer) stands for another member of the same domain (garbage collector). As in
the case of drug addiction, the upgrading eUect arises because the occupation of a
garbage collector is perceived as less prestigious than that of an engineer.
In stark contrast to Warren (1992) and some more recent studies (Reutner,
2009:119–154; Moskvin, 2010:163–227), which propose even more reVned classiV-
cations, the present article recognizes only two semantic euphemism-formation
mechanisms: either a metonymic or a metaphoric extension of the euphemism’s
literal meaning. This view is in full accord with present-day diachronic seman-
tics (e. g., Traugott & Dasher, 2002), which recognizes only two types of seman-
tic change: metonymy and metaphor. On the contrary, authors like Warren
and Moskvin, who distinguish between metonymy and particularization / hy-
pernymization, seem to be inWuenced by the very old logico-rhetorical typology
of semantic change, whose origins “go back to Aristotle’s analysis of metaphor”
(Ullmann, 1967:203). Thus, for Anttila (1972:148) the semantic development of
hound (“any dog” in Old English > “a hunting dog of a particular breed” in Mod-
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ern English) is not a whole-for-part metonymy (in which, like in the case of
satisfaction and the pill, the name of the conceptual domain has begun to be
used as a metonym for one of its members) but an instance of semantic narrow-
ing. Whereas metonymy and metaphor involve a “transfer to another conceptual
sphere,” narrowing of meaning as exempliVed by hound constitutes a “change
within the same conceptual sphere,” i. e., a change that did not aUect the semantic
range of the item under consideration: Hound has retained the semantic com-
ponent [dog]. As stated above, this article rejects the logico-rhetorical approach
and regards semantic narrowing as a whole-for-part metonymy. Correspond-
ingly, cases of semantic widening, such as to arrive for “to arrive at sea” in Old
English > “to arrive anywhere and by any means of locomotion” in Modern En-
glish (Ullmann, 1967:204) are regarded as part-for-whole metonymies.
4 Default and non-default metonymies
In their landmark article entitled “Metonymy: Developing a Cognitive Linguistic
Point of View,” Kövecses & Radden (1998) raise the question of why some meto-
nymic expressions are hardly recognizable as expressions that do not mean what
they literally stand for. For example, Prime Minister of England is an unrecog-
nizable part-for-whole metonymy meaning “Prime Minister of the entire United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (of which England is a part)”: Eng-
land does not have its own Prime Minister. If Prime Minister of England were a
recognizable metonymy, its use would most likely give rise to a semantic anomaly
(cf. Prime Minister of Wales). Similarly, black coUee seems to be a hardly recog-
nizable part-for-whole metonymy meaning “coUee without added milk or cream”
(Mel’čuk, 1995:182): The vehicle meaning “black color” is a characteristic of the
intended target meaning “coUee without milk or cream” (i. e., the absence of milk
or cream in a cup of coUee usually results in its black color).
According to Kövecses & Radden (1998), the non-recognizability of metonym-
ies like England for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and black color for absence of milk or cream stems from the fact
that the choice of their vehicle concepts England and black color fulVlls at least
some of the cognitive principles of relative salience. These include, for example,
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• human over non-human
• concrete over abstract
• interactional over non-interactional
• immediate over non-immediate
• dominant over less dominant
• specific over generic
• good gestalt over poor gestalt
• central over peripheral
• relevant over less relevant
• important over less important
These principles “relate to three general determinants of conceptual organiza-
tion” (p. 63):
1. human experience; e. g., human over non-human, concrete over ab-
stract, etc.
2. perceptual selectivity; e. g., immediate over non-immediate, dominant
over less dominant, etc.
3. cultural preference; e. g., central over peripheral, important over less
important, etc.
What is important here is that “the more of [these] principles apply to a par-
ticular metonymic expression, the greater the cognitive motivation. As a result,
the metonymy will be regarded as natural or ‘default’” (p. 71). Thus, the unrec-
ognizable metonymy Prime Minister of England is a default metonymy because
its vehicle concept England fulVlls the principle dominant over less domi-
nant (relating to perceptual selectivity): England is the most dominant part of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and can, therefore, be
easily understood as a metonym for the entire UK. Similarly, the hardly recog-
nizable metonymy black coUee is a default metonymy because its vehicle concept
black color fulVlls the principle immediate over non-immediate (also relating
to perceptual selectivity): i. e., Vrst of all, we see that a coUee is black, and only
then do we conclude that it contains no milk and cream.
Default metonymies like Prime Minister of England and black coUee can be con-
trasted with non-default metonymies, i. e., metonymic expressions whose vehicles
violate one or more of the above-named principles. For example, the euphemism
boyfriend can be considered a non-default metonymy because its vehicle concept
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friend violates the principle important over less important (or, alternatively,
the principles relevant over less relevant or central over peripheral), re-
lating to cultural preference. The most important characteristic of boyfriend-ship
is not friendship, but, rather, the sexual / romantic relationship between a woman
and her boyfriend. Friendship is, by contrast, a less important and / or less rel-
evant, even peripheral, characteristic. Thus, a woman can have more than one
literal friend, but only the one, who, in addition to being her friend, is also her
sexual partner qualiVes as her boyfriend. Similarly, the euphemism bathroom can
be analyzed as a non-default metonymy because its vehicle concept room with a
bath violates the same principles. The deVning characteristic of a toilet is that
its visitors urinate / defecate in a lavatory pan, not that they wash themselves in a
bathtub.
Given what has been said above, a question arises as to whether all metonymic
euphemisms can be regarded as non-default metonymies. (This question is left
unanswered by Kövecses and Radden because the focus of their article is not on
metonymic euphemisms but on all kinds of metonymic expressions and semantic
patterns underlying them.) The answer to this question depends on whether the
researcher equates default metonymies with unrecognizable metonymies, i. e., if
a given metonymic euphemism is not consciously recognized as an expression
that underwent metonymic reinterpretation, it can be considered a non-default
metonymy. Consider again the copulation euphemism to sleep with somebody.
As a Vrst approximation, this euphemism is also analyzable as a non-default
metonymy in which the choice of the vehicle concept violates the principle im-
portant over less important. Physical sleeping is a peripheral characteristic
of the copulation scenario: Far more important than spending time together in
the same bed at night or day time while being in the state of sleep is the fact
that lovers engage in sexual intercourse. At the same time, however, it is not
clear whether English speakers are consciously aware of this euphemism’s met-
onymic nature. Thus, observe the euphemistic use of to sleep with somebody in
contexts that do not involve physical sleeping; e. g., sex with a prostitute, after
which the customer typically goes away without literally sleeping with her (e. g.,
I recently learned that my husband has slept with many prostitutes in third world
countries, “Reckless Endangerment of Spouse – Legal Recourse?”, 2010). If to sleep
with somebody were a recognizable metonymy, than this euphemism would most
likely occur in sleeping contexts only. That is, it would refer not only to sexual
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intercourse (euphemistic meaning) but also to physical sleeping (literal meaning),
in other words, to a prototypical copulation scenario in which the former is im-
mediately followed by the latter. That to sleep with somebody does, however, occur
in non-sleeping contexts as well (and, what is more, this use does not give rise to
a semantic anomaly) corroborates the suggestion that the euphemistic meaning
“to copulate” does not activate the literal meaning “to sleep.” In this respect, to
sleep with somebody does not seem to be diUerent from the default metonymy
Prime Minister of England.
Alternatively, we can discard the recognizability criterion, i. e., regard a meto-
nymic euphemism like to sleep with somebody as non-default if its vehicle concept
violates at least some of the above-named principles. However, in this case, we
will inevitably run into the problem of mixed metonymies, i. e., metonymic ex-
pressions whose vehicle concepts simultaneously fulVll and violate one or the
other principle. A good example illustrating this point is to go to the toilet. On the
one hand, this euphemism is a non-default metonymy violating the principle im-
portant over less important: The literal act of going to a toilet is undoubtedly
a less important aspect of the using-a-toilet scenario than the act of urination /
defecation in it. On the other hand, however, to go to the toilet can be considered a
default metonymy because it is motivated by the antecedent–consequent relation
between its literal and euphemistic meaning and, accordingly, fulVlls the princi-
ple immediate over non-immediate: First of all, we physically go to the place
toilet and only then urinate / defecate in it. What is, then, the status of to go
to the toilet? Is it a default or a non-default metonymy?
5 Classifying metonymic euphemisms
Since it is not entirely clear in which case a metonymic expression qualiVes as de-
fault, this article does not apply the default–non-default distinction to metonymic
euphemisms. What it does instead, however, is classify metonymic euphemisms
with respect to the violation of one particular principle, the one which underlies
its euphemistic use. Thus, the fact that the vehicle concept of to go to the toilet
fulVlls the principle immediate over non-immediate does not really explain why
this expression can function as a euphemism for urination / defecation. (This does
explain, however, why to go to the toilet can be understood as a metonym for uri-
nation / defecation: In order to urinate / defecate, we, Vrst of all, need to literally
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go to some toilet.) What underlies the euphemistic function of to go to the toilet
is that the literal act of going to a toilet is a less important and a taboo-free aspect
of the using-a-toilet-scenario. Similarly, the literal act of sleeping is a less impor-
tant and a taboo-free characteristic of the copulation scenario; literal friendship
between a woman and her boyfriend is a less important and a taboo-free char-
acteristic of the concept of boyfriend-ship; etc.
5.1 Euphemisms violating the principle
important over less important
Metonymic euphemisms belonging to this category are metonymies like the afore-
mentioned examples to sleep with somebody, boyfriend, to go to the toilet, and
bathroom. In all of them, the euphemistic eUect results from the replacement of a
taboo-marked concept by a less important but taboo-free characteristic associated
with the same taboo subject.
Below are some other examples of metonymic euphemisms whose vehicle con-
cepts violate the principle important over less important. All of these ex-
amples have been taken from Richard Holder’s (2008) Oxford Dictionary of Eu-
phemisms.
As has been mentioned in connection with to sleep with somebody, metonym-
ic euphemisms belonging to this category can be used in contexts that are not
compatible with their literal meanings. That is, we can say John sleeps with Sarah
even if John and Sarah never fall asleep together in the same bed (e. g., McGlone
& Batchelor, 2003:251). Similarly, as Holder (2008:90) points out, the euphemistic
query Where’s the basement? can be “made in a building manifestly devoid of a
lower level.” The reason for this is obvious: Metonymic euphemisms like to sleep
with somebody and basement have vehicle concepts denoting peripheral charac-
teristics of the taboo-marked concepts that they express. That is, lovers do not
always fall asleep together after sex, and lavatories are not necessarily located in
building basements.
Given these uses of to sleep with somebody and basement, one of the anonymous
reviewers of this article raises the question of whether euphemisms like these can
still be regarded as metonymic euphemisms. That is, if lovers who have sex do
not always literally sleep with each other in the same bed, can we still claim that
in the case of to sleep with somebody, there exists a real link between the literal
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Table 1: Metonymic euphemisms violating the principle SPECIFIC OVER GENERIC
Euphemism Euphemistic
meaning
Violation of the principle
1 African-American “black” Much more important than being a person
whose ancestors came from Africa is the
fact that an African-American is a person
who has a black skin.
2 basement “lavatory” The fact that a lavatory is frequently lo-
cated in the basement of a shopping mall,
school, etc. is a rather peripheral charac-
teristic of the concept LAVATORY.
3 evacuee “a German citizen
(usually a Jew)
killed by the
Nazis”
Much more important than being literally
evacuated (i. e., removed from a military
zone or a dangerous place) is the fact that
evacuees were actually killed.
4 disturbed, as in,
e. g., disturbed
child
“naughty” Much more important than being literally
disturbed by somebody or something is the
fact that a disturbed child is naughty, i. e.,
that he or she does not behave well.
5 massage parlor /
sauna
“brothel” Much more important than being a place
where customers can get a massage / wash
themselves in a sauna is the fact that both a
massage parlor and a sauna are places for
paid sex.
6 mature “old” Much more important than being literally
mature (i. e., fully developed) is the fact
that a mature person is relatively old.
7 non-industrial
country
“poor and
relatively
uncivilized
country”
Much more important than the absence
of industry is the fact that a non-industrial
country is a poor country.
8 oldest profession “prostitution” Being the oldest profession is a peripheral
characteristic of the concept PROSTITUTION.
9 red lamp / red
light, as in, e. g.,
red light district
“brothel” Even though many brothels use red lamps
as their sign, this is, nevertheless, a periph-
eral characteristic of the concept BROTHEL.
10 visible “not
white-skinned”
Much more important than being literally
visible is the fact that a visible person does
not have a white skin.
meaning “to sleep” and the euphemistic meaning “to copulate”? According to the
reviewer, it can also be argued that “the two activities (sleeping with someone
and having sex with someone) share the aspect of privacy / intimacy, so that one
may be used as a metaphoric expression for the other.”
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In my view, the proposed analysis of to sleep with somebody as a metaphoric
euphemism is not correct. Despite the fact that sex is not always followed by
lovers’ co-sleeping, the expression to sleep with somebody still remains a meto-
nymically motivated euphemism. That is, when asked “Why can to sleep with
somebody be used as a euphemism for ‘to have sex’?”, a speaker of English, who
uses this expression in both sleeping and non-sleeping contexts, will still attribute
the idiomatic meaning “to have sex” to the antecedent–consequent relationship
between the events of having sex and sleeping: The latter is often immediately
followed by the former.
It is true that the activities of having sex and sleeping with someone share
the aspect of privacy / intimacy. However, this does not mean that to sleep with
somebody can be analyzed as a metaphoric euphemism. Quite the contrary – this
fact corroborates the metonymic analysis advocated in this article: We can claim
that to sleep with somebody is a part-for-part metonymy in which one element of
the domain privacy / intimacy – the concept of sleeping with someone – maps
onto another element within the same domain: the concept of having sex.
5.2 Euphemisms violating the principle specific over generic
Another euphemism-formation strategy involving metonymy is the violation of
the principle specific over generic (which, according to Kövecses & Radden
(1998:67–68), relates not to cultural preferences, but to perceptual selectivity).
This strategy underlies all whole-for-part metonymies like the previously men-
tioned adult Web site for “pornographic Web site,” satisfaction for “orgasm,” and
the pill for “contraceptive pill,” which Warren (1992) and Moskvin (2001, 2010) an-
alyze as instances of particularization / hypernymization. Euphemisms belonging
to this category violate the principle specific over generic because they express
rather speciVc concepts like pornographic Web site, orgasm, and contracep-
tive pill by means of rather generic concepts like adult Web site, satisfac-
tion, and the pill. Usually, the latter represents a hypernym of the former, but
observe the euphemistic use of do it in sentences like They did it, meaning “they
had sex with each other.” It is clear that do it cannot be a hypernym of copulate
because it is a deictic pronoun, which has no literal meaning of its own. As ar-
gued by Moskvin (2010:197–201), in the case of euphemistic utterances like They
did it, we are dealing with pronominalization, another important euphemism-
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formation mechanism, which must be distinguished from hypernymization. In
my view, however, this distinction is superWuous. In both pronominalization and
hypernymization euphemisms, the euphemistic eUect results from the violation of
one and the same principle: specific over generic: As in the case of adult Web
site, satisfaction, and the pill, do it represents a vehicle that has a very generic
meaning, i. e., apart from the taboo-marked target concept copulation, it can
refer to almost any activity.
Table 2 provides some further examples of euphemistic expression whose vehi-
cle concepts violate the principle specific over generic. All of these examples
have been taken from Holder (2008).
5.3 Euphemisms violating the principle
more true over less true
Finally, there are metonymic euphemisms like the previously mentioned cum
laude for “a bad dissertation grade defended in a German university” and sanitary
engineer for “garbage collector,” whose vehicle concepts provide rather inaccurate
characteristics of what these expressions denote as euphemisms. Thus, as argued
in the previous section, a dissertation awarded cum laude is, in reality, a rather
poor dissertation that does not deserve any praise. Similarly, the profession of a
garbage collector is considerably diUerent from that of an engineer. (Kövecses &
Radden (1998) do not mention the principle more true over less true in their
article, but I believe that it is precisely the violation of this principle that accounts
for the euphemistic use of all metonymic expressions discussed in this section of
the article).
Euphemisms whose vehicle concepts violate the principle more true over less
true can often be found among names of various insurances. For example, a
health insurance, which covers medical expenses when the insured falls ill, can
be better described as an illness (rather than as health) insurance: We need this
insurance mainly when we are ill, not when we are healthy. Similarly, a life insur-
ance, which “guarantees a speciVc sum of money to a designated beneVciary upon
the death of the insured” (American Heritage Dictionary), can be better referred
to as a death (rather than as life) insurance. According to Holder (2008:211), in
the case of health insurance and life insurance, the taboo subjects illnesses and
death are avoided by talking about their converses: health and life.
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Table 2: Metonymic euphemisms violating the principle IMPORTANT OVER LESS IMPORTANT
Euphemism Euphemistic
meaning
Violation of the principle
1 abnormal “homosexual” One can be perceived as abnormal in a variety
of ways, not only by being homosexual.
2 to adjust your
dress
“to do up the
fasteners on your
trousers”
One can adjust his dress in a variety of ways,
not necessarily by doing up the fasteners on his
trousers.
3 to betray / to
deceive
“to copulate with
a third party
while married”
One can betray / deceive in a variety of ways,
not only by copulating with a third party while
being married / having a regular sexual partner.
4 career change “dismissal from
employment”
Our careers can change in a variety of ways,
not necessarily through dismissal from employ-
ment.
5 to cleanse “to free from
enemy
occupation or
sympathizers”
One can cleanse in a variety of ways, not only
by freeing from enemy occupation or sympa-
thizers.
6 to do the right
thing
“to marry a
woman you have
impregnated”
One can do a right thing in a variety of ways,
not only by marrying an impregnated woman.
7 to downsize “to dismiss
employees”
One can downsize in a variety of ways, not
only by dismissing employees.
8 erection “an enlargement
of the penis due
to sexual
excitement”
Erection literally means “the condition of being
upright” (Holder:169). There are many things
that can be in that condition, not only the penis
of a sexually excited male.
9 financial
assistance
“state aid for the
poor”
State aid for the poor is not the only kind of
financial assistance.
10 good time “a sexual
experience with
a stranger”
One can have a good time in a variety of ways,
not only by having a sexual experience with a
stranger.
Some other examples of metonymic euphemisms belonging to this category are
given in Table 3.
Metonymic euphemisms of this type are often hardly distinguishable from
metaphoric euphemisms (and can perhaps be regarded as a borderline case be-
tween metonymy and metaphor). Like the former, the latter can also be analyzed
as violations of the principle more true over less true. For example, we can say
that the vehicle concepts of the metaphoric expressions to come for “to achieve an
orgasm” and to ride for “to copulate with a man in the woman-on-top position”
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Table 3: Metonymic euphemisms violating the principle MORE TRUE OVER LESS TRUE
Euphemism Euphemistic meaning Violation of the principle
1 academy “brothel” The institution of an academy is
considerably different from that
of a brothel.
2 actress “prostitute” The profession of an actress is con-
siderably different from that of a
prostitute.
3 to angle with a silver
hook
“to pretend to have
caught a fish that you
have bought”
A person who behaves in such a
way does not literally angle with
a silver hook.
4 art “pornographic” Pornography is not an art.
5 as planned (used as
“corporate-speak
when managers wish
to suggest that their
failure is not due to
their incompetence”;
Holder:83)
“regrettably” Failures like these are not really
planned by managers.
6 aunt “a promiscuous woman
or an elderly prostitute”
A promiscuous woman or an el-
derly prostitute is not an aunt in
relation to the person who refers
to her as an aunt.
7 bamboozled “drunk” A drunk person has not literally
been bamboozled, i. e., deceived
by underhanded methods (Merri-
am-Webster Online)
8 beaver3 “the female genitals
viewed sexually” (“from
the slang meaning a
beard, whence the pubic
hair”; Holder:92 )
The pubic hair is not a beard.
9 bikini wax “a procedure for the
removal of women’s
pubic hair”
It is the skin of a woman’s body
that is waxed, not the bikini.
10 bimbo “a sexually complaisant
female” (“from the
Italian, meaning ‘little
(male) child’”;
Holder:95)
A sexually complaisant female is
not a little male child.
3 Like to bang somebody, beaver is in present-day English a dysphemism (i. e., a rather vulgar expres-
sion for “the female genitalia viewed sexually”), rather than a euphemism. It is not entirely clear
why Holder (2008) analyzes it as a euphemism.
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provide very inaccurate descriptions of what happens when people come to an
orgasm and copulate while being on top. The reason why to come and to ride can,
nevertheless, be better analyzed as instances of metaphor, while the examples in
Table 3 are products of a metonymic semantic change, is that in contrast to the
former, the latter fulVll the aforementioned within-domain-mapping requirement
of metonymy. Consider, for example, the noun beaver for “the female genitals
viewed sexually.” At Vrst glance, there does not seem to exist a real link between
the meanings “beaver” and “the female genitals”: Beavers do not seem to have
much in common with the female genitalia viewed sexually. However, as Holder
argues, the sexual sense of beaver goes back not to the literal meaning “beaver,”
but to the slang meaning “a beard” (which is a product of metaphorization of
the literal meaning “beaver”: There is a visual similarity between a beaver and a
beard). In this case, beaver can be analyzed a part-for-part metonymy whose ve-
hicle concept beard maps onto the target concept the female genitalia within
the same domain human body. Similarly, we can analyze bimbo as a part-for-part
metonymy, rather than as a cross-domain metaphor, because its literal meaning
in Italian, “a little male child,” and its euphemistic sense in English, “a sexually
complaisant female,” are both human characteristics: i. e., a human being can be
a little male child and a sexually complaisant woman. Accordingly, bimbo is a
part-for-part metonymy whose vehicle concept little male child maps onto
the target concept sexually complaisant woman within the same domain of
human characteristics.
In addition to metaphoric euphemisms, metonymic euphemisms whose vehicle
concepts violate the principle more true over less true are also often not easily
distinguishable from instances of lying. Consider, for example, the famous ab-
breviation GDR for “German Democratic Republic.” Like the examples discussed
above, GDR is a part-for-part metonymy in which one element of the concep-
tual domain political systems – democracy – stands for another element within
the same domain: totalitarianism. Since democracy is radically diUerent from
totalitarianism and GDR was indeed a totalitarian state rather than a democracy,
it can be concluded that, in this abbreviation, the choice of the vehicle concept
democratic violates the principle more true over less true. (This is presum-
ably the reason for the inclusion of GDR in Holder’s dictionary of euphemisms.)
However, recall that euphemism is diUerent from lie in that, in the former case,
the speaker does not intend to deceive or mislead the hearer. That is, a German
258
Metonymic Euphemisms from a Cognitive Linguistic Point of View
professor who grades a doctoral dissertation with cum laude does not want to
be understood literally (i. e., that he indeed thinks that the dissertation he has
graded deserves praise). On the contrary, by using the grade cum laude, s/he
wants to indirectly communicate the meaning “this is a rather poor dissertation
that cannot be praised.” By contrast, the coiners of the abbreviation GDR (as well
as GDR rulers) wanted to be understood literally (i. e., that GDR was a genuinely
democratic country and not a totalitarian state). The use of German Democratic
Republic as the oXcial name of the East German State was, thus, a lie because the
leaders of the country knew that GDRwas not a democracy but nevertheless used
this abbreviation for political propaganda.
5.4 Mixed types
A number of metonymic euphemisms have vehicle concepts that simultaneously
violate the principles important over less important and more true over less
true. A good example is industrializing country for “a poor and relatively unde-
veloped country.” On the one hand, its vehicle concept clearly violates the prin-
ciple important over less important: The most important characteristic of an
industrializing country is its poverty and underdevelopment, not that it has an
ongoing industrialization, as the adjective industrializing suggests. In addition
to this, however, there is also a violation of the principle more true over less
true: As Holder (2008:226) points out, industrializing country is a “coinage based
on aspiration rather than reality.” What is meant by this is that an industrializing
country is typically a poor and underdeveloped country that has very little or
no industry at all. (There is no ongoing industrialization.) Similarly, the educa-
tional euphemism diUerently-abled for “crippled or of low intelligence” violates
both the principles important over less important and more true over less
true. With regard to the former, the deVning characteristic of a diUerently-abled
person is his crippleness or low intelligence, not the presence of other abilities.
With regard to the latter, diUerently-abled, like industrializing country, also seems
to be a coinage based on aspiration rather than reality: A diUerently-abled person
does not really have any diUerent abilities. Finally, recall that to sleep with some-
body and basement can be used to refer to lovers who do not fall asleep together
in the same bed after having sex and to lavatories that are not located in build-
ing basements. Given these facts, we can claim that the vehicle concepts of the
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euphemisms to sleep with somebody and basement simultaneously violate the prin-
ciples important over less important and more true over less true: Physical
sleeping with somebody is a peripheral characteristic of the prototypical copula-
tion scenario, which, in a number of cases (e. g., during sex with prostitutes), does
not immediately follow the more important characteristic sexual intercourse.
Additionally, the fact that lavatories are often located in building basements is a
peripheral characteristic of a lavatory that is not true of all lavatories. (As the
examples to sleep with somebody and basement demonstrate, euphemisms whose
vehicle concepts violate the principle important over less important are par-
ticularly prone to develop into euphemisms violating the principle more true
over less true.)
6 Concluding remarks
The central claim of this article is that there exists a relatively small number of
metonymy-based euphemism-formation mechanisms. One is to express a taboo-
marked target by means of a less important but taboo-free vehicle associated with
the target (violation of the principle important over less important). In addi-
tion, a euphemism can be created by means of replacing a taboo-marked target by
either a very generic taboo-free vehicle (violation of the principle specific over
generic) or by a not entirely accurate or even untrue taboo-free vehicle (viola-
tion of the principle more true over less true). The major advantage of this
classiVcation is that it provides an explanation for why a particular euphemistic
expression can function as a euphemism, i. e., be used for indirectly expressing
taboo-marked concepts. For example, boyfriend can function as a euphemism
for “a male sexual partner in a non-marital sexual relationship” because its vehi-
cle concept friendship provides a peripheral characteristic of the target concept
boyfriend-ship; adult Web site can function as a euphemism for “a pornographic
Web site” because its vehicle concept adultWeb site provides a very generic de-
scription of what an adult Web site is. Furthermore, health insurance can function
as a euphemism for “illness insurance” because its vehicle concept health insur-
ance provides a rather inaccurate description of why we need a health insurance.
Another major advantage is that this classiVcation demonstrates a connection be-
tween metonymy- and metaphor-based euphemism-formation mechanisms. As
we have seen, metaphoric euphemisms like to come and to ride also violate the
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principle more true over less true and are, therefore, sometimes not easily dis-
tinguishable frommetonymies like health insurance, sanitary engineer, beaver, and
the like.
7 Acknowledgements
I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful com-
ments on an earlier version of this article. Special thanks go to my former col-
league Wiebke Ostermann for her scrupulous proofreading of the Vnal version
of the manuscript. I, alone, am responsible for any remaining errors and short-
comings.
References
Adams, J. 1981. A type of sexual euphemism in Latin. Phoenix, 35 (2). 120–128.
Adams, M. 1999. Another eXng euphemism. American Speech, 74 (1). 110–112.
Adult. 2013. Merriam-Webster Online. Retrieved March 29, 2014 from http://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/adult
Anttila, R. 1972. An introduction to historical and comparative linguistics. New
York: The MacMillan Company.
À outrance. 2014. Merriam-Webster Online. Retrieved March 29, 2014 from hp://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/à+outrance
Are you having trouble reaching orgasm? A guide for women. (2011, May 22).
Retrieved March 29, 2014 from http://tinyurl.com/cjq35ce
Bamboozle. 2014. Merriam-Webster Online. Retrieved March 29, 2014 from http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bamboozled
Bang. 2014. Merriam-Webster Online. Retrieved March 29, 2014 from http://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bang
Blank, A. 1999. Why do new meanings occur? A cognitive typology of the moti-
vations for lexical semantic change. In A. Blank, & P. Koch (eds.), Historical
semantics and cognition, 61–91. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Crespo Fernández, E. 2006a. Metaphor in the euphemistic manipulation of the
taboo of sex. Babel: Aspectos de Filoloxía Inglesa e Alemá, 15, 27–42.
Crespo Fernández, E. 2006b. The language of death: Euphemism and conceptual
metaphorization in Victorian obituaries. SKY Journal of Linguistics 19. 101–
261
Alexander Tokar
130.
Crespo Fernández, E. 2007. El eufemismo y el disfemismo: Procesos de manipulación
del tabú en el lenguaje literario ingles. Alicante: University of Alicante Press.
Crespo Fernández, E. 2008. Sex-related euphemism and dysphemism: An analysis
in terms of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Journal of the Spanish Association
of Anglo-American Studies 30 (2). 95–110.
Cruse, A. 2004. Meaning in language: An introduction to semantics and pragmatics
(2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cum laude. 2005–2007. In Brockhaus – die Enzyklopädie in 30 Bänden (21st fully
revised ed.). Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus.
Davies, M. 2008–. The corpus of contemporary American English (COCA). Retrieved
March 29, 2014 from http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/
Farghal, M. 1995. Euphemism in Arabic: A Gricean interpretation.Anthropological
Linguistics 37 (3). 366–378.
Forschungsstipendien für promovierte Nachwuchswissenschaftler (Postdoc-Pro-
gramm). (n. d.).Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst. Retrieved March 29,
2014 from http://tinyurl.com/cdkgtan
Friend. 2014.WordNet: A lexical database for English. Princeton: Cognitive Science
Laboratory of Princeton University. Retrieved March 29, 2014 from http://
wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=friend&sub=Search+WordNet&o2
=&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5=&o9=&o6=&o3=&o4=&h=
Halmari, H. 2011. Political correctness, euphemism, and language change: The
case of ‘people Vrst.’ Journal of Pragmatic 43. 828–840.
Holder, R. W. 2008. Oxford dictionary of euphemisms: How not to say what you
mean (4th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
How to make your woman reach an orgasm fast! 2012, February 29. Retrieved
March 29, 2014 from http://www.articletrader.com/society/sexuality/how-to
-make-your-woman-reach-an-orgasm-fast.html
Kövecses, Z. 2006. Language, mind, and culture: A practical introduction. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Kövecses, Z., & Radden, G. 1998. Metonymy: developing a cognitive linguistic
view. Cognitive Linguistics 9 (1). 37–77.
LakoU, G., & Johnson, M. 1980. Metaphors we live by. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press.
262
References
LakoU, G., & Turner, M. 1989. More than cool reason: A Veld guide to poetic
metaphor. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Life insurance. Fourth Edition 2000. Updated in 2009. The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language. Published by Houghton MiYin Com-
pany. Retrieved March 29, 2014 from http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Life
-insurance
Linfoot-Ham, K. 2005. The linguistics of euphemism: A diachronic study of eu-
phemism formation. Journal of Language and Linguistics 4 (2). 227–263.
McGlone, M., & Batchelor, J. 2003. Looking out for number one: Euphemism and
face. Journal of Communication 53 (2). 251–264.
Mel’čuk, I. 1995. Phrasemes in language and phraseology in linguistics. In M. Ev-
eraert, E.-J. van der Linden, A. Schenk, & R. Schreuder (eds.), Idioms: structural
and psychological perspectives, 167–223. Hilsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Asso-
ciates.
Moskvin, V. P. 2001. Èvfemizmy: Sistemnye svjazi, funkcii i sposoby obrazovanija
[Euphemisms: Systemic relations, functions and formation mechanisms]. Vo-
prosy Jazykoznanija 3. 58–70.
Moskvin, V. P. 2010. Èvfemizmy v leksičeskoj sisteme sovremennogo russkogo jazyka
[Euphemisms in the lexical system of modern Russian] (4th ed.). Moscow:
Lenand.
Pound, L. 1936. American euphemisms for dying, death, and burial: An anthology.
American Speech 11 (3). 195–202.
Reutner, U. 2009. Sprache und Tabu: Interpretationen zu Französischen und Ital-
ienischen Euphemismen. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.
Taylor, J. 2002. Cognitive grammar. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tokar, A. 2009. Metaphors of the Web 2.0: With special emphasis on social networks
and folksonomies. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
Traugott, E. C., & Dasher, R. B. 2002. Regularity in semantic change. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Ullmann, S. 1967. The principles of semantics (2nd ed.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Warren, B. 1992. What euphemisms tell us about the interpretation of words.
Studia Linguistica 46 (2). 128–172.
263
Alexander Tokar
Author
Alexander Tokar
Department of Linguistics
University of California at Berkeley
alexandertokar1980@gmail.com
264
